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Fellows of Salzburg Global's latest Pathways to Peace Initiative present findings on how developing countries in regions like Africa, Latin America, South Asia, and Southeast Asia can help address global challenges
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Salzburg Global Seminar convened a program on "Crossing New Rivers by Feeling the Stones? Aspirations, Expectations, and China's Role in the 21st Century" from February 18 to 21, 2024, as part of its broader Pathways to Peace Initiative. During this program, Salzburg Global Fellows from 14 countries gathered to discuss the pressing issue of global interaction with China; they incorporated the perspectives of narrative frameworks, economic challenges, technology, and pathways for future engagement in light of rising geopolitical tensions.
Four working groups were tasked with addressing different aspects of this engagement. In the working group findings summarized below, Fellows were asked to consider how the Global South, chiefly Africa and Latin America, can contribute their voice to mitigating geopolitical tensions. Fellows opted to reframe the question of mitigating geopolitical tensions in favor of focusing on how the Global South can more effectively bring their voice to global challenges. While China has often sought to project itself as the representative voice of the Global South, other large economies, especially India, also compete for that role.
This document records the discussion and proposes findings for further dialogue rather than firm policy recommendations.
Fellows considered how the Global South, referring to developing countries in regions like Africa, Latin America, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, can contribute their collective voice to address global challenges. Rather than adopting narratives from any particular entity, Fellows argued for the Global South to bolster its own Indigenous knowledge-generating capacity to better represent their own national interests.
Fellows proposed adopting an issue-based approach focusing initially on topics such as climate change and debt relief, including building or tapping into existing “voice-granting” institutions like ASEAN and the G20. The group advocated for China’s potential role in providing solutions rather than viewing it necessarily as an emerging superpower threat.
Views of China differ vastly among Global South countries and regions, depending on the nature and depth of China’s engagement. In democratic nations, such as Brazil and Argentina, government attitudes can change across elected administrations. China can be part of potential solutions through initiatives like its Global Development Initiative, but it is also seen as an emerging threat. China should be part of the solution, especially on topics like climate change and debt relief.
Greater accountability mechanisms now enable developing countries to better leverage Chinese investment and financing for their national benefit. One pathway to access better accountability mechanisms and stronger leverage over Chinese power for national benefit may be to strengthen Indigenous, i.e. local, country-specific, knowledge generation and analytical capacity about China in Global South countries.
If countries develop their own analyses of China and do not simply accept narratives generated by the Global North (the US) or China, they will be better positioned to advocate for their own interests. Further, these analyses may be more agnostic about Chinese power, recognizing both potential benefits and harms, and could lead to more balanced global discourse on China, particularly when addressing shared global challenges.
China studies programs that were developed in the Global North in the 1960s and 1970s have been foundational in the understanding of China today; these serve as a potential model for Global South nations developing their Indigenous research capabilities. This kind of project may face institutional and funding barriers, as academic institutions demonstrate a diminished commitment to area studies as a framework for analysis.
Given the oft-divergent interests of Global South nations, countries will likely be most effective on issues where interests overlap strongly. While the scope is smaller, the collective impact is likely to be more pronounced. The pursuit of “small deltas” is likely more realistic given that bigger projects might be too ambitious. Moreover, small delta initiatives can serve as examples that collectively gather momentum in transforming larger conditions, and they can be amplified and multiplied more easily.
Small delta projects can pave the way for further exploration of more aspirational, big-picture ambitions. It is vital to tackle achievable issues while continuously pursuing longer-term, more ambitious projects.
Small delta initiatives imply an issue-specific approach rather than broad institutional reforms. Concrete issues mentioned include climate change, debt relief, trade policy, and the provision of essential services like healthcare and education. Fellows diverged on which of these issues should be prioritized.
Issue-based approaches can be addressed in regional bodies like the African Union, ASEAN, and Mercosur; global forums like the G20 and COP climate talks are existing platforms where Global South countries can raise issues and exert collective influence. Development banks, such as the AIIB and the BRICS New Development Bank, are also partners that are well-suited to pursuing issue-specific initiatives.
Countries in the Global North beyond the US can also play a meaningful role in elevating the voices of the Global South. The so-called Middle power countries like Canada and Japan have highly developed institutional capacities whose support outside of the "Great Power Competition" framework can help articulate, coordinate, and amplify Global South initiatives. Middle powers can use their turns in leadership roles of the G20 and other forums to promote the Global South agenda.
Fellows agreed that emphasizing the mitigation of global challenges is more illuminating than a discussion of mitigating geopolitical tensions. In addition, the definition of Global South, whether based on geography, development level, governance considerations, or geopolitical alignment, influences how we analyze the issues. Key distinctions regarding the size of economies can distinguish between bigger countries like India and Brazil and smaller African and Latin American countries. Another differentiation is between democracies and autocracies, as differences may shape interests and interactions in Global South-related groupings and with China.
China does not like the term "Global South" and has said it does not want to assume a leadership role. However, China does often seek to position itself as the “big brother” of the Global South, particularly in multilateral venues like the UN or the COP.
Some countries, including those in the Global South, also dislike the term. Countries falling under the umbrella of the term have agency to handle their participation within the group and with larger powers, including the US, EU, India, and China. Defining them as part of a collective Global South group is at times interpreted as diminishing their agency.
For the purposes of the discussion, more weight was assigned to economic and development aspects rather than political considerations. Despite the definitional challenges, on questions of development and modernization, most of these countries would be inclined to adopt the shared identity of the Global South. The collective identity increases their bargaining power and leverage.